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INTRODUCTION 
Instead of saying, as we always have, that the death penalty is first of all a 
necessity, and afterwards that it is advisable not to talk about it, we should first 
speak of what the death penalty really is, and only then decide if, being what 
it is, it is necessary. 1 
Picture this: On Monday morning, June 13, 1994, the former wife of 
a national sports celebrity is found murdered in front of her Brentwood, 
California townhouse.2 Along with her body is also found the corpse 
of a 25-year-old male friend.3 The scene is described by police officers 
as among the most gruesome they have ever viewed.4 The ex-wife is 
nearly decapitated and the state of the male corpse provides evidence of 
a fierce struggle. 5 The scene is drenched in blood. · Six days later the 
sports celebrity is charged with double homicide. 6 Under California 
law, a double homicide constitutes an "aggravating circumstance" 
entitling the prosecution to seek the death penalty.7 The celebrity, who 
1. ALBERT CAMUS, REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE 7 (Richard Howard trans., 
1957). 
2. Josh Meyer & Eric Malnic, O.J. Simpson's Ex-Wife, Man Found Slain, L.A. 
TIMES, June 14, 1994, at Al. 
3. Id. 
4. See CNN News (CNN television broadcast, July 1, 1994) (transcript 349-5) 
(criminal defense attorney Roger Cossack: "I have a contact in the police department 
who has told me that this is one of the most gruesome crime scenes that they have ever 
seen."). 
5. See CNN News (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 23, 1994) (transcript 406-1) 
(Lt. John Rogers of the Los Angeles police department comments on the crime scene); 
CNN News (CNN television broadcast, July 11, 1994, (transcript 359-1) (same). 
6. Jim Newton & Shawn Hubler, Simpson Held After Wild Chase, L.A. TIMES, 
June 18, 1994, at Al. 
7. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). 
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has an estimated net worth of more than ten million dollars, 8 hires a 
battery of world renowned attorneys, forensic experts, and investiga-
tors.9 
Within weeks, experts conclude that the celebrity will probably not 
face the possibility of the gas chamber 10because of his celebrity status 
and because the victim is his spouse. 11 Less than three months after 
the celebrity is charged with the crimes, the prosecution announces that 
although the state contends that the brutal murders were premeditated, 
the state shall not seek the death penalty. 12 No specific reasons are 
given by the prosecution for its decision. 13 
Now picture this: An African-American male murders a white 
female. The evidence against him is highly circumstantial-there are no 
8. See Alan Abrahamson, Simpson Legal Fees Could Run Into Millions, L.A. 
TIMES, July 9, 1994, at Al (an accountant hired by Nicole Brown Simpson in connection 
with the couple's 1992 divorce estimated Mr. Simpson's net worth at $10.8 million). 
9. Simpson's trial team consisted not only of noted trial attorneys Robert 
Shapiro, Johnnie Cochran and F. Lee Bailey, but also noted appellate attorney Alan 
Dershowitz, noted criminal procedure expert Gerald Delman, noted DNA expert Barry 
C. Scheck, and attorneys Sara Caplan, Carl E. Douglas, Peter Neufeld, and Robert 
Kardashian. The forensic experts employed by Mr. Simpson include Dr. Henry Lee, 
Michael Baden, Dr. Edward Blake, and Robert Blasier. Mr. Simpson also obtained the 
services of a jury consultant, Jo-Ellen Dimitrius; an expert on battered women, Lenore 
Walker; and a number of investigators, including John E. McNally, Zvonko Pavelic, and 
Patrick J. McKenna. 
10. It should be noted that a federal court recently held that California's method 
of execution-by administration of lethal gas - violates the Eighth Amendment. Fierro 
v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
11. Henry Weinstein & Alan Abrahamson, Death Penalty Unlikely for Simpson, 
Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1994, at Al. The reasons cited for the likelihood that 
the death penalty would not be sought were described as follows: 
There are many reasons why [Simpson] likely will be an exception [to the 
rule of seeking the death penalty]: He does not have a lengthy criminal history. 
He has been a national hero. It has become increasingly difficult for 
prosecutors to obtain the death penalty in Los Angeles County. Seeking the 
death penalty might make it more difficult to garner a conviction. His 
execution would leave two young children of one of the victims without a 
parent. And, finally, the death penalty is rarely imposed in spousal murders. 
Id. See also Linda Deutsch, Will Simpson Face the Death Penalty? Race and Celebrity 
Play a Big Role. Smart Money Says The D.A. Will Go For A Life Sentence, PHILADEL-
PHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 6, 1994, at A5; John Riley, Lawyers: O.J. Could Sidestep Death 
Penalty, NEWSDAY, June 19, 1994, at A52. 
12. Jim Newton & Ralph Frammolino, Prosecution Won't Seek Death Penalty 
Against Simpson, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1994, at Al. 
13. Id. (In a letter sent to Simpson's lawyers, Assistant Dist. Atty. Frank 
Sundstedt said the decision was made after "consideration of all available aggravating 
and mitigating penalty phase evidence."). 
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eyewitnesses.14 The defendant, who cannot afford an attorney, is 
represented by an overworked public defender. The death penalty is 
sought by the state because of, among other reasons, the "quality" of the 
victim. After a short trial, a verdict is returned. The defendant is 
sentenced to death.15 
O.J. Simpson is lucky. During the same period when prosecutors 
considered whether to seek the death penalty against Simpson, 2812 
people in this country were sitting on death row. 16 Most were poor, 
many were black, and many were guilty of murdering whites.17 It is 
likely, nay, inevitable, that some of these people were not guilty of the 
crime for which they had been sentenced. Some of these people will be 
executed. Are their deaths necessary? Beneficial? Justifiable? 
Three rationales are often advanced in justification of the continued 
imposition of the death penalty: (1) deterrence, (2) safety, and (3) 
retribution. 
Empirical data concerning the death penalty's deterrent value shows 
that the justification is dubious at best. Far more studies show that 
capital punishment empirically has no deterrent value when compared to 
studies that reach the opposite conclusion. In fact, the evidence seems 
to indicate that capital punishment actually tends to increase the 
homicide rate. With respect to the murders of Nicole Simpson and 
Ronald Goldman, it is unlikely that the death penalty, which was on the 
statute books in California at the time, 18 had a deterrent effect on the 
murderer. It apparently did not enter the calculus of the decision-maker 
14. Although not empirically verifiable, it is likely that for many, if not most, 
premeditated murders there are no eye-witnesses. So it naturally follows that there must 
be many cases fitting this profile. An example of a case with a factual background 
strikingly similar to the Simpson case is State v. Lane, 72 Ariz. 220, 233 P.2d 437 
(1951 ), where Charles Lane was sentenced to death for the murder of his ex-wife after 
a seven day trial in which no eye-witnesses presented testimony. 
15. It has been well documented that when a black murders a white he is far more 
likely to be sentenced to death than if he murders another black. See McClesky v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987) (citing David C. Baldus, et al., Comparative Review 
of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 661, 707-10 (1983)). 
16. Weinstein & Abrahamson, supra note 11, at Al. 
17. A recent study reveals that although blacks only make up 12% of the general 
population, they represent 40% of the death row population. Katie Monagle, The Death 
Penalty; Race May Determine Justice, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Sept. 4, 1992, at 13. In 
many states the disparities are shocking. For example, blacks make up the following 
percentages of death row prisoners in the following states: Maryland (90%), Illinois 
(63%), Pennsylvania (60%). Id. When the race of the victim is taken into account the 
disparity is even greater: 84% of the inmates on death row murdered whites. Id. Since 
1945 only one white person has been executed for murdering a black. Id.; see also 
Michael Ross, Is the Death Penalty Racist?, HUM. RTS. Q., Summer 1994, at 32. 
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). 
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with a sufficient gravity to change the ultimate decision. Would 
deterrence be proved, however, if the rich and powerful were subject to 
capital punishment's force? Who can say? It is clear, however, that the 
question will never be answered because the penalty is unlikely to be 
imposed, given its legal requirements, on a person who can afford to hire 
exemplary legal counsel. 19 
Capital punishment's safety justification also lacks merit. Of course, 
if a murderer is executed, he no longer poses a threat to the safety of the 
community. However, our safety can be equally protected by the 
provision for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Further-
more, the public safety argument has little merit in cases like People v. 
Simpson.20 In that case, prosecutors claim that the defendant acted out 
of jealousy.21 This is an implicit acknowledgement that the potential 
victims were not the public-at-large, but the object of his wrath-his ex-
wife. 
19. In 1972, the Supreme Court held that most capital punishment statutes in the 
nation at the time were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because the 
statutes provided jurors with unguided discretion. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
( 1972). Before Furman, unbridled discretion resulted in an aberrant ( and unconstitution-
al) pattern of sentencing. Id. at 249-50. To cure the constitutional infirmity, capital 
sentencing statutes were thereafter re-written to give juries detailed guided discretion. 
See .RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 59-63 (1991). 
Since the imposition of the death penalty now turns on detailed, specific enumerated 
aggravating and mitigating factors (see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.2), a premium is 
placed on trial counsel's ability to develop and explore mitigating circumstances 
concerning the defendant's background, experience, and psychological makeup. Experts 
are often hired to make the latter evaluation. 
The failure to present such evidence can have disastrous consequences. In one 
Georgia case, Jerome Holloway was sentenced to death. Holloway v. State, 361 S.E.2d 
794 (Ga. 1987). Mr. Holloway had an IQ of 49 and an intellectual capacity of a 7-year 
old. Unfortunately, his counsel failed to present this evidence. See Stephen B. Bright, 
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst 
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837 (1994). The same was true of Alvin Smith who had 
an IQ of 65. Id. (referring to Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Ga. 1987) 
(setting aside death sentence on other grounds), ajf'd sub nom. Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d 
1407 (11th Cir. 1989) (en bane)). 
20. Felony Complaint For Arrest Warrant at 1, People v. Simpson, No. 
BA09721 l, available at 1994 WL 564433, at *1. 
21. See Excerpts of Opening Statements by Simpson Prosecutors, L.A. TIMES, 
J.an. 25, 1995, at A14 [hereinafter Excerpts of Opening· Statements by Simpson 
Prosecutors]; see also CNN News (CNN television broadcast, November 7, 1994, 5:00 
p.m. (EST)) (transcript 1037) available at 1994 WL 3691744, at *2 (concerning possible 
sources of a "jealous obsession" theory); Bill Boyarsky, A Cynical Game of Leaks, 
Denials, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at A20. 
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Given that there is no good evidence that the death penalty serves 
a deterrent function and given that the safety function can be equally 
served with a less drastic measure, the only true justification that remains 
is retribution. In recent years there has been much debate as to the 
legitimacy of retributive justice.22 However, in the context of the 
Simpson case, capital punishment justifications based on retributive 
theory come under closer scrutiny. The public's lack of desire for 
retribution most likely influenced the prosecution's decision to not seek 
the death penalty against Simpson.23 As a result, the Simpson case 
exemplifies the arbitrary nature of the death penalty when it is sought on 
retributive grounds. In any event, even if retribution is a legitimate 
interest, capital punishment is still not warranted. 
A number of studies (anecdotal and otherwise) indicate that innocent 
persons have been sentenced to death.24 This is hardly surprising for 
a number of reasons. First, capital punishment must ordinarily be 
premised on a finding of first degree homicide (that is, premeditated 
murder).25 Because the crime ordinarily involves a great degree of 
secrecy and stealth, convictions are often based on circumstantial 
evidence. As a result, a first degree murder conviction presents a greater 
possibility of error than other crimes in which the miscreant does not as 
22. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED (1992); Samuel 
H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989); Robert Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal 
Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379 (1979); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF 
PUNISHMENTS (1976); M. Kay Harris, Disquisition on the Need for a New Model for 
Criminal Sanctioning Systems, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 263 (1975); JOHN KLEINIG, 
PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 
(1975); Richard Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty?, in PHIL. PERSP. ON PUNISHMENT 
328 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972). 
23. For example, in a Field Organization poll takl;)n shortly after the murders, only 
35% of white respondents and 3% of black respondents believed that the prosecutor 
should seek the death penalty. NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, July 19, 
1994) available at 1994 WL 3519927 at *2. A Gallup Organization survey of 1,011 
adults conducted July 25-29, 1994 came up with similar results: 39% of white 
respondents and 10% of black respondents favored the death penalty for Mr. Simpson. 
Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 52, 54. 
24. See infra note 101: The most recent example of the execution of an innocent 
man comes from Huntsville, Texas. Jesse Jacobs was convicted in 1986 of the murder 
of the former wife of his sister's boyfriend. Jacobs confessed but later recanted. Jacob's 
sister was later convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the same crime. Although the 
evidence was fairly compelling that Mr. Jacobs did not pull the trigger, the United States 
Supreme Court denied his stay of execution. See Jacob v. Scott, 31 F .3d 1319 ( 5th Cir. 
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 711 (1995) (mem.); Faster Isn't Always Better, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at M4. 
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-5-1 (1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§§ 19.02 
& 19.03 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 1995); MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 210.2 (1985). 
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actively plan out and conceal his crime. It is thus inevitable that a 
certain percent of innocent people will be convicted of first degree 
murder, especially where the victim is a sympathetic person26 and the 
defendant is unpopular. Additionally, given the class-based nature of the 
system many first-degree homicide defendants are inadequately served 
by their trial counsel. Unlike Simpson, most defendants simply cannot 
afford to present to a jury numerous alternative scenarios of the 
crime.27 Potential "reasonable doubts" only exist to the extent they are 
presented at trial. Moreover, even where it is indisputable that the 
defendant committed the act, absolute culpability can never be firmly 
established because of the mens rea requirement ( especially in light of 
emerging medical and biological evidence vitiating the notion of free 
will).28 . 
The question thus becomes: Should we impose a perfect (that is to 
say, irreversible) penalty in the context of an imperfect (that is to say, 
error-prone) system? More specifically: Given that it is inevitable that 
innocent people will be condemned to death, is there a legitimate 
purpose being served by killing an innocent person? If it could be 
proven that the death penalty was necessary for deterrence or safety, 
arguably a (weak) argument could be advanced. But given that the only 
rationale that survives is retribution, it is hard to justify the continued 
existence of capital punishment. 
It is not the purpose of the author to survey all the extensive literature 
on the topic of the death penalty. More than one thousand books have 
been written on the topic and the arguments, by now, are all familiar.29 
Rather, this Article examines the traditional rationales advanced in 
support of the death penalty in light of the Simpson case. In many 
ways, the Simpson case sheds light on the essential unfairness, 
26. In newspaper stories concerning the Simpson case, several prosecutors 
commented that, among other things, in deciding whether or not to pursue the death 
penalty, the ."quality" of the victim plays a critical role. Weinstein & Abrahamson, 
supra note 11, at A3 l. 
27. This is demonstrated by the various and sundry theories the defense has given, 
such as the rogue-racist-cop theory. See Jeffrey Toobin, An Incendiary Defense, NEW 
YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 56. 
28. See infra part II.B.l. 
29. Three excellent and comprehensive books on the topic are: JOHAN THORSTEN 
SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1980); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974); and ERNEST VAN DEN 
HAAG & JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY:. A DEBATE (1983). 
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arbitrariness and inefficacy of capital punishment. Part One of this 
Article reviews the traditional philosophical justifications advanced in 
support of the death penalty and compares them with the empirical data 
currently available. Deterrence is discussed in the context of its 
historical promoters, primarily the utilitarians, as represented by Jeremy 
Bentham. Safety is discussed in the context of sociological studies 
regarding recidivism. And retributive justice is discussed in the context 
of Immanuel Kant's methodology and recent formulations by current 
legal scholars. The justifications are also discussed, paying particular 
attention to how they do or do not apply in the Simpson case. 
Part Two looks at the data concerning, and the reasons for, the 
incidence of conviction error in capital cases. Emphasis will be placed 
on the difficulty of establishing the crime, the subjectivity of the mens 
rea requirement in the context of psycho-biological data and the 
problems inherent in obtaining justice where the defendant is penurious. 
Special attention is given to the type and quality of representation 
accorded Simpson as contrasted with the type and quality of representa-
tion accorded most capital defendants. 
Part Three concludes by comparing the empirical data with the 
philosophical justifications for capital punishment. It is the position of 
the author that when we discover essentially what capital punishment is 
all about, it is clear that it cannot be considered necessary. 
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE AND THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A. Deterrence 
1. Theory 
The argument most often advanced in support of the death penalty is 
that it saves lives. The premise is based on the utilitarian notion that the 
law should maximize the aggregate "good" to society. 
Utilitarianism can be traced to the ancient Greeks.30 Jeremy 
30. See PLATO, THE LAWS (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1970). 
Protagoras expressed the opinion that since a past wrong cannot be undone, punishment 
serves the goal of deterring the wrongdoer in the future. Although not strictly a 
utilitarian, Epicurus (270-234 B.C.) can also be viewed as the seminal figure in 
utilitarianism. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century English philosophers who 
developed the theory, namely Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, premised their 
philosophy on a monistic view of morality. For these theorists, the "good" (i.e., moral) 
is congruent with that from which pleasure is derived. Epicurus first advanced the 
principle that pleasure is the end to which mankind should strive. See Epicurus, Letter 
to Menoeceus and Principle Doctrines, in THE ESSENTIAL EPICURUS, 61, 69 {Eugene 
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Bentham, an Eighteenth century English social reformer, popularized the 
application of utilitarianism to penal legislation.31 Bentham developed 
his philosophy during the so-called Age of Reason, as a reaction to 
theological philosophy (i.e., natural law) which he regarded as unscien-
tific.32 His philosophy can be summarized as follows: The first 
O'Connor trans., Prometheus Books 1993). 
31. Jeremy Bentham, who indisputably was the leader of the philosophical 
movement known as utilitarianism, is and was considered by many, including John 
Stuart Mill, to be not so much a philosopher as a social reformer because of his failure 
to offer proof with respect to his first principle that the good is pleasure. JOHN 
PLAMENATZ, THE ENGLISH. UTILITARIANS 77 (1966). The most common critique of 
Bentham (and Mill, for that matter) is that he engages in psychological reductionism by 
simplifying human nature. What is most amazing, however, is that the deterrence 
argument, which is likewise based on unproven behavioral assumptions, has not 
significantly evolved since the time of Bentham. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Amicus Curiae 
brief at 34, Fowler v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904 (1974) (No. 73-7031) ("The efforts 
of most criminals to avoid detection and to escape after being caught, show very clearly 
that they are sensitive to a calculus of pains and pleasures."); see also Michael Davis, 
Death, Deterrence and the Method of Common Sense, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 145 
(1981). 
32. The importance of this historical fact--that Bentham was reacting to people 
such as Thomas Aquinas, St. Anselm, and St. Augustine - cannot be underestimated. 
This reaction is more clearly seen in the writings of John Stuart Mill, Bentham's 
ideological heir. Mill lamented the fact that the history of scientific thought was 
constantly advancing while moral philosophy had remained stagnant for centuries. JOHN 
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 306-15 (Longmans, Green & Co. 1901). Rather than 
engage in deontological ruminations (like Immanuel Kant) with respect to morality and 
truth, Mill proposed that legislation and morals involve practical, rather. than theoretical 
concerns. Id. Thus, the approach that was suggested was supposedly based on 
empiricism and not any notions of intuitive morality. In Mills' words: 
Whether happiness be or be not the end to which morality should be referred 
to an end of some sort, and not left in the dominion of vague feeling or 
inexpiable internal conviction, that it be made a matter of reason and 
calculation, and not merely sentiment, is essential to the very idea of moral 
philosophy; is, in fact, what renders argument or discourse on moral questions 
possible. 
JOHN STUART MILL, Bentham, in ESSAYS ON ETHICS, RELIGION AND SOCIETY 75 (J.M. 
Robson ed., 1969). The relevance of this, of course, is that utilitarianism avoids 
subjective moral arguments because of its mechanical rigidity and ends-centered 
pragmatism. Thus, it is certainly true, as one author recently noted, that the guilt or 
innocence of a potential capital punishment victim is irrelevant with respect to the 
success of a utilitarian/deterrence argument. Eric Reitan, Why the Deterrence Argument 
for Capital Punishment Fails, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1993, at 26, 30. 
The sole question for the utilitarian is whether pleasure, in the aggregate, is 
advanced. Whether utilitarianism can be defended on moral grounds is highly 
problematic. Thomas Carlyle, the nineteenth century English philosopher, reportedly 
referred to utilitarianism as a "pig philosophy." ALAN RYAN, JOHN STUART MILL 200 
(1970). 
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principle of moral philosophy is the principle of utility. Utility means 
that every person is morally obligated to promote the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number of persons. Happiness (which is synonymous 
with the good) means pleasure. Human action, inasmuch as it produces 
or reduces pleasure, can only be judged based on its consequences and 
not its motives. It is the function of the state to sanction human action, 
where such sanction is necessary for the promotion of the common good. 
Deterrence is a legitimate aim of legislation to the extent it maximizes 
the common good by inhibiting those who would reduce the common 
good and by providing a common source of security for all. The degree 
of depravity of an individual's disposition is inversely proportional to the 
strength of the temptation needed to prompt him to a malevolent act. 
The lawmaker, in passing legislation, must estimate the strength of the 
temptation to do malevolence and make the punishment sufficiently 
severe to act as.a deterrent.33 
Although Bentham saw punishment, in and of itself, as an evil 
(punishment leads to pain and pain is the opposite of pleasure), later 
utilitarians have justified its use in the context of the death penalty 
because, it is argued, its absence will lead to greater evil. In other 
words, the death penalty is seen as the result of a morally-justified 
tradeoff. Society sacrifices a convicted murderer in order to protect an 
indefinite number of innocent victims. Sparing the murderer's life, a 
utilitarian would argue, runs the risk of endangering innocent people.34 
The utilitarian believes it is possible to deduce moral propositions 
from psychological assumptions; the main psychological assumption 
being that every potential murderer is a rational and calculating 
individual who will weigh the costs incident to certain behaviors with 
the resultant benefits to be derived and choose to do that which 
maximizes his own pleasure (i.e. choose to do an act only when its 
benefit outweighs its constituent cost.) 
The utilitarian/deterrence argument also rests on a number of other 
assumptions with respect to human behavior and motivation: 
1. Potential murderers will have knowledge of the potential punish-
ment to be meted out for their crimes; 
2. The State's legal sanction of involuntary execution will not, in the 
mind of the potential murderer, legitimize his illegitimate actions; 
33. See JEREMY BEN1HAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 14-19 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1982); JEREMY BEN1HAM, 
Principles of Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365 (Russell & Russell 
1962). 
34. VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 29, at 69. 
500 
[VOL.32: 491, 1995] Reflections 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
3. A potential murderer values the continuation of his own life as a 
greater benefit than the cessation of another's life; and 
4. Death is a greater deterrent to conduct by a potential murderer than 
.is the possibility of life-long incarceration.35 
2. Practice 
How does the deterrence argument hold against experience? The 
overwhelming weight of the evidence suggests that capital punishment 
saves no lives. There simply is no proof of any deterrent effect. 
The most thorough empirical studies have been undertaken by 
Thorsten Sellin, a noted criminologist, who originally drafted a report for 
the Model Penal Code Project for the American Law Institute in 1959 
and followed up this report with studies in 1967 and 1980.36 Sellin 
conducted two types of studies: (1) studies comparing the homicide rate 
in capital punishment states with the homicide rate in non-capital 
punishment states and (2) studies comparing the homicide rate in a state 
when capital punishment is in effect with the homicide rate in the same 
state after it has been abolished. 
Sellin's first study compared the homicide rates in geographically 
contiguous states.37 The study assumed that geographically contiguous 
states were likely to have similar historical, economic, and cultural 
backgrounds.38 As a result, such a comparison would tend to reduce 
the incidence of confounding variables. The results were startling. 
There was no evidence that the homicide rate was generally lower in the 
35. It should be noted that Bentham's original formulation is not as simplistic as 
later adherents to the doctrine of deterrence. Bentham, for example, believed that 
individuals had varied, diverse and individuated dispositions colored by education and 
socioeconomic factors. Thus, Bentham posited what has become known as "act 
utilitarianism," which requires a calculation of each act, as opposed to "rule utilitarian-
ism," which adopts general rules based on a cost-benefit analysis in common situations 
WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 35-41 (2d ed. 1973). Bentham's emphasis was more 
on education than on penal legislation. 
36. THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY: A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL 
CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1959); THORSTEN SELLIN, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (1967); THORSTEN SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1980). 
37. THORSTEN SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH 122-33 (1980). The first set of 
contiguous states Sellin looked at included Michigan, Indiana and Ohio, id. at 144, the 
second set included Minnesota, Iowa and Wisconsin, id. at 149, the third set included 
North Dakota, South Dakota and Nebraska, id. at 151, 168, and the final set included 
Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Connecticut, id. at 147. 
38. Id. at 132. 
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capital punishment states when compared to the non-capital punishment 
states.39 In 1988, new studies replicated Sellin's results.40 
In 1967, Sellin undertook a more focused state-by-state study that 
analyzed the deterrent effect of the death penalty on a particular type of 
capital homicide: police officer killings.41 It has frequently been argued 
that the death penalty should have the greatest deterrent effect on 
murders of arresting police officers.42 Once again, the evidence 
indicated that there was no deterrent effect from use of the death penalty. 
In fact, in a· 1980 study conducted by Sellin, the evidence indicated that 
police officers had a higher risk of being killed in states that employed 
the death penalty.43 Sellin's :findings were once again replicated by 
others in 1982 and 1987.44 
Only one researcher reached results contrary to Sellin--lsaac 
Ehrlich.45 Ehrlich's analysis rested on the assumption that some, but 
not all, offenders respond to incentives. Using an economic model, he 
reported a causal relationship between the rate of murder and the 
probabilities of apprehension, conviction, and execution. Ehrlich also 
suggested there exists a systematic relationship between employment and 
earning opportunities on the one hand and the frequency of murder and 
related crimes on the other. His empirical data is not inconsistent with 
the hypothesis that, on balance, capital punishment reduces the murder 
rate. He reported that the murder rate is correlated negatively with 
participation in the labor force and positively with the rate of unemploy-
39. Id. at 171-72. The results ofSellin's study and the findings ofother scholars 
are summarized in PATERNOSTER, supra note 19, at 222. 
40. Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Murder and Capital Punishment in 
the Evolving Context of the Post-Furman Era, 66 Soc. FORCES 774, 784-85 (1988). The 
researchers looked at homicide rates for the period of 1973-1984 and found no overall 
deterrent effect. The time period chosen corresponded to homicide rates after the 
Supreme Court clarified the issue of the constitutionality of capital punishment in 
Furman v Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Prior to that time it could have been argued 
that the death penalty had been so rarely imposed as to not yield a valid statistical model 
for analysis. Sellin's original research covered a time period (1920-1955) that preceded 
Furman. 
41. THORSTEN SELLIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 138-54 (1967). 
42. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 29, at 234 ("Without the death penalty an 
offender having committed a crime that leads to imprisonment for life has nothing to 
lose if he murders the arresting officer."). 
43. SELLIN, supra note 37, at 97. 
44. William C. Bailey, Capital Punishment and Lethal Assaults Against Police, 
19 CRIMINOLOGY 608, 613 (1982), William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Police 
Killings and Capital Punishment: The Post Furman Period, 25 CRIMINOLOGY l, 12 
(1987). These studies went further than Sellin's original study by taking into account 
other factors such as the risk or certainty of execution. 
45. Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effort of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life 
and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV, 397, 401-02 (1975). 
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ment. Ehrlich's results, however, have been completely refuted and 
discredited.46 
The second type of research undertaken by Sellin looked at homicide 
rates within one state where the state had periods with and without the 
death penalty ("retentionist" and "abolitionist" periods,-respectively).47 
The evidence once again indicated that homicide rates during abolitionist 
periods and during retentionist periods did not vary significantly.48 
Sellin's original research results were replicated in _1983 and 1988 by 
others.49 
Sellin did not study the short term effect of publicized executions. 
However, other researchers have investigated whether publicizing 
executions has a deterrent effect on homicide. The results are, once 
again, startling. The overall conclusion is that the local homicide rate 
actually tends to increase shortly after publicized executions.50 This is 
the so-called "brutalization effect."51 Executions tend to have a 
brutalizing effect on the local populace by, in some sense, legitimizing 
murder. The incongruity of the death penalty was noted as early as 
1764 by Italian utilitarian, Cesare di Beccaria: 
46. William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac 
Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187, 192 (1975); Peter Pasell 
& John B. Taylor, The Deterrence Controversy: A Reconsideration of the Time Series 
Evidence, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 357, 359 (Hugo A. Bedau 
& Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976); Brian E. Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960s, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743, 745 (1977); 
Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the 
Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 783 (1981); 
Stephen J. Knorr, Comment, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Temporal Cross-
Sectional Approach, 70 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 235, 240 (1979). 
47. SELLIN, supra note 41, at 315-16. 
48. Id. at 315. 
49. Richard Lempert, The Effect of Executions on Homicide: A New Look in an 
Old Light, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 88, 93 (1983); Peterson & Bailey, supra note 44, at 12. 
50. Leonard D. Savitz, A Study in Capital Punishment, 49 J. OF CRIM. LAW, 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. SCI. 338, 341 (1958); David R. King, The Brutalization Effect: 
Execution Publicity and the Incidence of Homicide in South Carolina, 57 Soc. FORCES 
683, 685-87 (1978); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: 
What is the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453, 456 (1980); William C. 
Bailey, Disaggregation in Deterrence and Death Penalty Research: The Case of Murder 
in Chicago, 74 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 855 (1983); David D. Phillips, The 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. 
J. OF Soc. 139, 146 (1980). 
51. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 50, at 453, 456. 
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[L]aws designed to temper human conduct should not embrace a savage 
example which is all the more baneful when the legally sanctioned death is 
inflicted deliberately and ceremoniously. To me it is an absurdity that the law 
which expresses the common will and detests and punishes homicide should 
itself commit one. 52 
3. Observations 
When it comes to the deterrence argument, theory and practice are at 
odds. Part of the difficulty lies in the problems inherent in social 
science analysis in general. Because behavior can be influenced by so 
many factors, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to scientifically trace 
the sociological etymology of a particular behavior. In the context of 
such a historically persistent problem like crime, the uncertainty is 
magnified. 53 One author suggests that the deterrence argument can 
never be proven for this reason: 
[A]fter all possible inquiry, including the probing of all possible methods of 
inquiry, we do not know, and for systematic and easily visible reasons cannot 
know, what the truth about this 'deterrent' effect may be .... 
The inescapable flaw is . . . that social conditions in any state are not 
constant through time, and that social conditions are not the same in any two 
states. If an effect were observed (and the observed effects, one way or 
another, are not large) then one could not at all tell whether any of this effect 
is attributable to the presence or absence of capital punishment. A 
'scientific'--that is to say, a soundly based-conclusion is simply impossible, 
and no methodological path out of this tangle suggests itself.54 
Hegel reportedly observed that if reality did not comport with his 
theory so much the worse for reality. And so it goes with the deterrence 
argument: the argument persists in the face of empirical evidence to the 
52. SELLIN, supra note 41, at 43 (1967) (citing CESARE DI BECCARIA, ON CRIMES 
AND PUNISHMENT (1764)). 
53. Of course, one of the common criticisms of the empirical data concerning the 
deterrence argument is that it is of too recent vintage. Because the death penalty has 
been so infrequently imposed in this country over the last fifty years, no true analysis 
can be undertaken. That is, presumably in the "good old days" capital punishment was 
routinely and commonly administered, and one would expect to find a commensurate 
deterrence effect as a result of its predictability. Unfortunately, most (if not all) social 
scientific studies concerning capital punishment/deterrence have been undertaken in this 
century. Older evidence, by necessity, is anecdotal. The anecdotal evidence, however, 
does not bear out that capital punishment is an effective deterrent. It was once observed 
that at a time when public hanging was common in Great Britain, 164 of 167 condemned 
criminals awaiting execution in Bristol prison had personally witnessed one or more 
executions. CARL WELLMAN, MORALS AND ETHICS 273 (1975). Apparently these 
individuals were not deterred. And there is, of course, the often repeated incident 
reported by Boswell, in his Life of Johnson, of Dr. Johnson observing four pickpockets 
active in a crowd assembled to view a pickpocket hanged. 
54. BLACK, supra note 29, at 25-26, quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
185 (1976). 
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contrary. The deterrence argument probably persists because of its 
common sense appeal. 55 
The "common sense" of the argument is founded on assumptions 
regarding human behavior, the foremost being the rationality of the 
criminal mind. This assumption may be flawed. I will defer that 
discussion, however, for Parts Two and Three of this Article. 
With respect to the Simpson case, a number of salient points 
concerning deterrence can be inade. First, and most obviously, the crime 
was committed in a state where the death penalty is in full force and 
effect56 and capital punishment is routinely a major campaign issue.57 
In short, the majority of the populace is undoubtedly aware that death is 
a possible sentence for first degree murder.58 Yet, the murderer was 
obviously not deterred. It may, of course, be the case that the murderer 
was not deterred because he acted in rage.59 And while the murderer's 
rage may not sufficiently negate a charge of first degree homicide, 60 it 
nonetheless limited the actor's ability to rationally weigh the conse-
quences of his actions.61 
What is so extraordinary about the Simpson case is that it is so 
ordinary. The prosecution's case-in-chief reflects, in many respects, the 
typical statistical profile of a homicide case in the United States. About 
eighty percent of all murders in this country are committed by people 
55. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Death, Deterrence, and the Method of Common 
Sense, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 145 (1981). 
56. Of the 2,812 people on death row in 1994, 388 (or 14%) are are in California. 
Weinstein & Abrahamson, supra note 11, at Al. 
57. See Robert Scheer, Death Penalty: A Fashionable Idea for the '90s, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at M5 {commenting on the use of the death penalty as a campaign 
issue in the 1994 California gubernatorial campaign); James Ridgeway, Death Becomes 
Us: The Capital Punishment Craze, L.A. VILLAGE VIEW, Oct. 7-13, 1994, at 6 (noting 
that the death penalty has become so politically popular that only one politician of 
national stature, the recently defeated ex-governor of New York, Mario Cuomo, is 
publicly opposed to it). 
58. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Horses of the Night: Harris v. Vasquez, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 1011 (1993) (regarding the notoriety surrounding the execution of Robert Alton 
Harris). 
59. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
60. Many courts hold that premeditation can literally occur in seconds. That is, 
the deliberation required to satisfy the mens rea requirement for first degree homicide 
can occur over a very short period of time. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 
525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963); Hammil v. People, 145 Colo. 577,361 P.2d 117 (1961). 
61. Things such as leaving bloody gloves at the crime scene confirm this, at least 
circumstantially. 
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who knew their victim.62 Half of the victims had a social or romantic 
connection to the murderer.63 It has been estimated that there are 2500 
spousal homicides annually.64 Reportedly, Simpson told others that if 
he could not have Nicole, no one could.65 The murder was most likely 
not the act of a calculating mind. In this sense, the murder, as presented 
by prosecutors in the Simpson case, was typical. Deterrence in this 




A second justification frequently advanced for the death penalty is 
safety. The argument is fairly straightforward: if a convicted murderer 
is put to death, there is zero probability that he will murder again. The 
underlying assumption is that since the person has murdered in the past 
he presents a greater threat to society in the future than do other 
individuals. Thus, society is protected by incapacitating this threat. 
2. Practice 
A number of studies have examined the threat posed by a convicted 
murderer to commit another murder or serious offense. The overall 
conclusion is that convicted murderers are actually less likely to commit 
further homicides than other criminals (such as those incarcerated for 
property offenses). That is, if one looks at the prison population and 
attempts to predict the threat of future homicide, a murder conviction is 
not a terribly meaningful variable-it will no more predict future 
homicidal behavior than would a conviction for other offenses. 
Two types of studies, generally, have been undertaken: (1) studies 
looking at the behavior of convicted murderers in prison after their 
62. John M. Dawson & Barbara Boland, Murder in Large Urban Counties, 1988, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP., May 1993, at 4. 
63. Id. 
64. See Andrea Stone et al., Women Who Become Statistics, USA TODAY, July 
13, 1994, at 3A (reporting that 2,500 women a year are killed by intimate partners). 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics there were 1,059 spousal homicides in 1988 
alone. Id. 
65. Ray Richmond, Therapist Under Fire; Forward Prefers to Talk About Book, 
TV Special, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1994, at l (Dr. Susan Forward, Nicole Simpson's 
therapist, quotes Nicole Simpson as having told her that O.J. threatened, "Ifl can't have 
you, no one can!"). 
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conviction, and (2) studies looking at the behavior of convicted 
murderers in the general population after being released from prison. 
The first set of studies--studies examining the behavior of convicted 
murderers while incarcerated----focus on the institutional violence of 
capital offenders. In 1988, Marquart and Sorenson studied the behavior 
of Texas death row inmates, from 1973 to 1986, who were released into 
the general prison population after their sentences had been commuted 
to life. 66 Of the forty-six inmates in the group, not one committed 
another homicide.67 The following year, the researchers broadened 
their study by looking at 558 inmates from twenty-nine states and the 
District of Columbia whose death sentences had been commuted.68 
Only six (or one percent) committed another murder while incarcerat-
ed.69 Other studies show that convicted murderers are no more violent 
in prison than inmates incarcerated for non-homicide offenses.70 
The second set of studies--studies examining the behavior of 
convicted murderers released into the general population--reach similar 
results. The two most comprehensive studies were undertaken by 
Stanton and Sellin. In his study in 1969, Stanton looked at the behavior 
of 7370 inmates released into the general public for various reasons.71 
Of this total, sixty-five were convicted murderers.72 Persons previously 
66. James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, Institutional and Postrelease 
Behavior ofFurman-committed Inmates in Texas, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 677, 677-78 (1988). 
67. Id. at 688. It should be noted that these inmates' sentences had been 
commuted because the Supreme Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). This is important because had the offenders 
committed another offense they would not have been sentenced to death, but merely life 
imprisonment (a sentence they were already serving). This is another example of how 
the deterrence argument has been shown to be erroneous. 
68. James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorenson, A National Study of the Furman-
Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society From Capital Offenders, 23 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 5, 27 (1989). 
69. Four of the victims were other inmates and two were correctional officers. 
Id. at 21. 
70. See THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1982). His survey of federal 
prison violence for the year 1964 revealed that 84 percent of prison homicides were 
committed by inmates committed for non-homicide offenses. .Inmates incarcerated for 
property crimes were three times as likely to commit a homicide as compared to 
convicted murderers. Sellin's follow-up study for the year 1965 indicated that 89 
percent of the homicides in prison that year were committed by non-capital murder 
offenders. 
71. John M. Stanton, Murderers on Parole, 15 CRIM. & DELINQ. 149, 149-55 
(1969). 
72. Id. at 150. 
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convicted of non-homicide offenses were three times as likely to be 
rearrested as homicide offenders.73 Stanton's follow up study, looking 
at the years 1948 through 1957, indicated that non-homicide offenders 
were four times as likely to be rearrested.74 Sellin looked at the 
activity of 63,065 released inmates, including 6800 persons convicted of 
willful homicide.75 The evidence indicated that those convicted of 
armed robbery, aggravated assault, and forcible rape were more likely to 
kill after release than those convicted of premeditated murder. 
Moreover, of the 6800 released murderers 99.7% did not commit another 
murder. 
Other researchers have reached similar results. 76 One author has 
summarized the conclusions of the various studies as follows: 
[T]he few studies that have been conducted do not indicate that offenders who 
had been sentenced to death are highly prone to commit another murder or 
another offense either in the confines of the prison or if released to the 
community. Those who have been sentenced to death are not likely to commit 
serious or assaultive offenses while in prison, nor are they likely to commit 
homicide or a violent offense when released on parole. In fact, it would appear 
from these data that former capital defendants constitute somewhat less of a risk 
to fellow prisoners, prison staff members, and the general public than 
incarcerated property offenders. 77 
3. Observations 
If the sole goal of the death penalty is protection, capital punishment, 
as presently constituted, is underinclusive and ineffective. The people 
convicted of capital offenses, while certainly more prone to violence 
than the general public, appear to be no more prone to violence than 
other (non-capital) offenders. The state is killing the wrong people. The 
world is simply not an appreciably safer place by executing only those 
convicted of capital offenses. 
73. Id. at 152. 
74. Id. 
75. See SELLIN, supra note 70. 
76. See Marquart & Sorenson, supra note 66, at 26-28; Hugo A. Bedeau, Death 
Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. I (1964); Hugo A. Bedeau, 
Capital Punishment in Oregon 1903-1964, 45 OR. L. REV. 1, 34 (1965); Stanton, supra 
note 71, at 155; Gennaro F. Vito & Deborah G. Wilson, Back From the Dead: Tracking 
the Progress of Kentucky's Furman Commuted Death Row Population, 5 JUST. Q. 101, 
110 (1988). 
77. PATERNOSTER, supra note 19, at 240. For other studies reaching similar 
results see HENRY J. STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY 
INSANE 100-06 (1974) (tracking the behavior of over 1,000 inmates transferred to civil 
mental hospitals); TERENCE P. THORNBERRY & JOSEPH E. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY 
INSANE: A COMMUNITY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS (1979) (tracking 
over 500 patients from a maximum security institution for the criminally insane). 
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Safety, like deterrence, appears to be based on a number of "common 
sense" assumptions concerning human behavior. But when it comes to 
people who murder, these assumptions are highly problematic. 
Discussion concerning the roots of the problem will be deferred to Parts 
II and III of this Article. 
With regard to the Simpson case, one point stands out: in deciding 
whether or not to seek the death penalty, the prosecution probably 
considered the potential threat to the community posed by the defen-
dant. 78 The prosecution, while not stating its reasons for doing so, 
probably chose not to pursue the death penalty because of, among other 
reasons, Simpson's lack of a substantial prior criminal record and the 
fact that the victim was his spouse.79 In short, the prosecution most 
likely felt that Simpson was not a good candidate for asserting a "public 
threat" because of the alleged narrow focus of his wrath. That is, he 
only presented a threat to one person--his former wife. But, of course, 
if a prosecutor were normally driven by such rational motives, the death 
penalty would rarely be sought. The vast majority of murderers simply 
do not pose a threat of murdering again. The reason for applying the 
death penalty must be found elsewhere. Capital punishment apparently 
is not driven by any safety argument. 
C. Retribution 
1. Theory 
A third justification advanced in favor of the death penalty is 
retribution. Society, as a whole, presumably feels better ( or at least is 
brought into equilibrium) when the life of those who take a life is 
taken.80 Retribution is not based on any utilitarian, or at least easily 
verifiable utilitarian, principle. That is, retributive justice is not based 
on a notion of an end justifying a mean. Rather, it is based on the 
deontological notion that some things, in and of themselves, are justified 
and moral. 
78. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
79. Only 1.2% of all men currently on death row killed their wives or ex-wives. 
Weinstein & Abrahamson, supra note 11, at Al. 
80. Equilibrium is defined by Hegel as homeostasis: the state of being before 
offensive behavior has been committed. 
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The seminal figure in retributive justice is Immanuel Kant. Kant 
believed that nothing is unconditionally good except the "good will." 
The good will rationally acts out of a sense of duty. Duty represents the 
moral law and consists of observing three categorical imperatives: (1) 
one should act consistent with a principle which one would will to 
become universal law; (2) in so acting, persons must be treated as an 
end, in and of themselves, and never as a means; and (3) one should act 
as if one was legislating for a universal end.81 
The ultimate moral value is human freedom.82 Government exists to 
expand human freedom. Ironically, human freedom is expanded when 
citizens surrender some freedoms - the freedom to do that which is 
legally proscribed-so that society can enjoy the freedom obtained by 
being secure. Freedom is the only value which can be used to limit 
freedom. It therefore follows that some forms of coercion are morally 
permissible to the extent they advance, and are consistent with, rational 
freedom.83 
Government, which acts to expand freedom in general by restricting 
it in particular, acts by consent. People consent to government coercion 
(i.e., the rule of law) because they benefit by having others obey the law. 
Law provides people with security which, in tum, expands their 
freedom.84 
The coercion exerted by the government in enforcing the rule of law 
does not entail a violation of personal freedom so long as it can be 
shown that in some antecedent position of choice85 a person would 
have been rational to adopt such a rule. Consent is the key: persons 
consent to the rule of law and, more importantly, to the consequences 
that :flow from a violation of the rule. Violation of the rule merits 
punishment because of the theory of political obligation.86 
Kant's theory of political obligation is, to some extent, consistent 
with Rousseau's notion of the social contract (i.e., the polity's implicit 
81. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 62 
(1785). 
82. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 35, 43-44 
(1797). 
83. Id. at 36. 
84. Id. at 76. 
85. John Rawls refers to this "antecedent position" as the "original position." 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971). Briefly stated: a just (or moral) 
principle is a rule that would be agreed to by rational, self-interested, and unenvious 
persons who know they have entered into a society structured according to their 
agreement, but who do not know a priori what positions, or natural endowments, or 
particular interests they will have or occupy in that society. Id. The act of choosing the 
rule is based on Kant's first categorical imperative. 
86. Kant, supra note 81 at 113. 
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assent to legal arrangements). 87 If the law is to remain just, there must 
be some guarantee that those who disobey it will not gain an unfair 
advantage over those who obey. Criminal wrongdoing inherently entails 
gaining an unfair advantage or profit (i.e., being relieved of the burden 
of self restraint). Criminal punishment then, has as its object the 
restoration of the proper balance between benefit and obedience. 
To what degree must punishment be meted out? Kant's answer is 
based on the principle of equality: 
What kind of what degree of punishment does public legal justice adopt as its 
principle and standard? None other than the principle of equality (illustrated 
by the pointer of the scales of justice), that is, the principle of not treating one 
side more favorably than the other. Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you 
inflict on someone else among the people is one you do to yourself. If you 
vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; 
if you kill him, you kill yourself. . . . To say, "I will to be punished if I 
murder someone" can mean nothing more than, "I submit myself along with 
everyone else to those laws which, if there are any criminals among the people, 
will naturally include penal laws."88 
This is the theory of retributive justice. Members of society who 
violate the moral law have consented to punishment. Punishment entails 
paying back a debt to society. The principle of equality requires that the 
payment be proportionate to the advantage unfairly obtained. Lex 
talionis (the principle of "an eye for an eye") requires that those who 
have taken a life be put to death. It is the only method by which 
societal equilibrium. can be restored. 89 
87. Id. 
88. See supra note 85. 
89. Kant's theory proposes that criminals deserve to be punished because of the 
unfair advantage they have obtained. The state is morally required to nullify this 
advantage. The degree of nullification is to be measured by the rule of strict equality 
(lex talionis). It therefore follows that the only morally appropriate sanction for murder 
is death. 
Another example of a recent Kantian justification is based on the principle of 
corrective justice. "[C]orrective justice is that branch of justice that requires those who 
cause losses by acting in wrongful ways to repair, correct, or annul such losses." Jean 
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1663 (1992). 
[R]etribution is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value 
of the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action through the construction of an 
event that not only repudiates the action's message of superiority over the 
victim but does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their 
humanity. 
Id. at 1685. 
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Modem day proponents of the death penalty also ground their 
justifications on retribution. Their theories, however, have a decidedly 
more psychological or anthropological bent. Two recent examples will 
suffice. Walter Berns, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise 
Institute, in his book90 and elsewhere,91 justifies the death penalty as 
an appropriate societal psychological response to heinous crimes. Basing 
his theory on Aristotle's proposition that anger is not only a justified 
response to, but also intimately connected with, the notion of justice, 
Berns justifies the death penalty as a way of rewarding this anger and 
thus teaching law-abidingness. In so doing, the law inspires awe in 
human life by making its taking subject to the most drastic of conse-
quences. 
J. Anthony Paredes, an anthropologist, views the death penalty as 
being connected with the populace's magical belief that death will 
restore order in a disorganized society.92 This belief is based on the 
tribunal structure of the family, where retribution is justified for the 
killing of a family member. 
2. Practice 
Since retribution is based on the deontological notion that goodness 
inheres to an act itself, and is not based on the act's consequences, it is 
a little more than difficult to test the hypothesis empirically. It is simply 
impossible to quantify, for example, how society is brought back into 
equilibrium when a murderer is executed. 
Recent retributivist justifications are based on the notion of what we 
can call, for the lack of a better term, collective relief or collective 
release. Public opinion polls can be used to test the assumption that 
retribution is the underlying justification supporting capital punishment. 
In a 1985 Gallup poll, nearly fifty percent of those expressing support 
for the death penalty reported that their support was based on either their 
notion of lex talionis ("an eye for an eye") or the notion that murderers 
simply deserved to die.93 A 1986 poll by the same organization 
showed that seventy-three percent of those in favor of the death penalty 
90. WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND MORALITY AND 
THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 152, 173 (1979). 
91. See Walter Berns, Defending the Death Penalty, 26 CRIM. & DELINQ. 503, 
509-11 (1980). 
92. J. Anthony Paredes, Some Anthropological Observations on Capital 
Punishment in the USA, 17 INT'L. J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 220 (1993). 
93. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 19, at 246. In the poll, 72% of those polled 
favored the death penalty. Of the supporters, 30% did so based on lex ta/ionis and 18% 
on just desserts. 
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would still be in favor of the death penalty even if it could be proved 
that it had no deterrent effect.94 
3. Observations 
While the arguments based on deterrence and safety are grounded on 
assumptions concerning the behavior of the offender, the argument 
regarding retribution is based on no such assumption. Rather, retribution 
is based on an empirically untestable philosophical proposition. 
However, to the extent the theory is based upon the perception of a 
public need, it seems to be borne out by the popularity of the death 
penalty. Whether this "bloodlust" is a sufficient justification for killing 
the innocent will be addressed in Part III
With regard to the Simpson case, it is interesting to note that public 
opinion polls conducted shortly after the murder indicated that nearly 
two-thirds of all white respondents and nearly all black respondents 
believed that Simpson should not get the death penalty.95 The public's 
lack of desire for retribution can be explained in several ways: Simpson 
is a national celebrity; he is an African-American who rose from 
poverty.96 In short, he is a person whose other accomplishments 
outweigh ( or at least mitigate) warranting the ultimate sentence. If 
Simpson is found guilty, most people feel he does not deserve to die.97 
But why not? The fact that someone is a rich and famous celebrity 
should be irrelevant. If anything, these factors should cut the other way. 
That is, if a person has wealth and advantage, then he has less excuse 
for his behavior. But presumably, "a man is more than the worst thing 
he has ever done."98 We know of Simpson's other accomplishments. 
Many see themselves in Simpson. This feeling tempers their desire for 
vengeance. The common perception of Simpson is that he is not a wild 
animal or a vicious killer. Those who believe he is guilty see him as a 
flawed human being. But once again, the reasoning is illogical. If 
anything, this heightens his moral responsibility since he is a person of 
94. Id. 
95. See supra note 23. 
96. Ron Borges et al., How Carefully Crafted Image was Shattered by Killings, 
TORONTO STAR, June 25, 1994, at Al. 
97. See Michael Kinsley, What Americans Won't Do, TIME, June 27, 1994, at 80. 
98. SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKlNG 61 (1994) (concerning the 
author's first hand experience of ministering to accused killers). 
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"normal" experience who has acted abnormally. It is one thing to have 
grown up in and been surrounded by a depravity so overwhelming that 
it shapes one's life and behavior. It is another thing to not be in an 
environment that so warps one's personality. In the latter setting it is 
easier to argue that one has freely chosen his destiny, whereas in the 
former, destiny is imposed by forces beyond the control of the actor. 
But it is, of course, those from the worst backgrounds who are sentenced 
to death, 99 those who by their nature and circumstance prevent us from 
feeling empathy simply because of their "foreignness." 
The public's response to the Simpson case highlights that the 
retribution argument is theoretical and does not comport to reality. 
People want others to die not so much because they are morally 
deserving (i.e., because they acted out of free will and chose their 
punishment) but rather, because they are somehow repugnant to our 
sensibilities. But this repugnance or depravity does not necessarily entail 
an exercise of free will. The death penalty is thus reserved for those to 
whom we feel alienation. It is reserved for those in whom we cannot see 
ourselves. 
IL THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE BASES FOR THE 
INCIDENCE OF ERROR 
Any legal system will be imperfect since these systems are designed 
by men and women. Like the wrongfully-convicted Dmitri in 
Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, 100 innocent people have been 
and will always be convicted. It is inevitable. But are there certain 
offenses more prone to conviction error than other offenses? First 
degree homicide may be such an offense because of the elements of the 
crime the state must establish, the manner in which the elements are 
established, and the socio-economic vagaries of the defendant. 
A. The Empirical Evidence 
1. Practice 
Two recent studies have shed light on the issue of conviction error in 
capital cases. The first is the well-publicized article by Professors Hugo 
99. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
100. FYODER DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (R. Pevear & L. 
Volokhonsky trans.). 
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Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet. 101 Bedau and Radelet looked 
at capital cases in the United States during the twentieth century. In 
particular, they looked at "potentially capital cases:" cases in which a 
person was convicted of an offense that fell within the class of capital 
offenses regardless of whether the particular jurisdiction administered the 
death penalty.102 Their study concluded that 350 innocent persons 
were wrongfully convicted of capital crimes and twenty-three were 
wrongfully executed. 103 In more than one third of these cases, Bedau 
and Radelet found perjury by a prosecution witness. 104 In twenty 
percent of these cases, they found that a conviction was obtained, at least 
in part, because it was demanded by community outrage.105 
The New York State Defenders Association's Wrongful Conviction 
Study Project conducted the second study in 1991.106 The researchers 
looked at homicide convictions in New York state during the period of 
1965 to 1988. The study focused on those convicted of homicide, 
regardless of whether such conviction constituted a capital offense. In 
determining whether the original conviction was in error the study 
looked at objective criteria: cases where the conviction was overturned 
and either (1) the defendant was subsequently acquitted on retrial, (2) the 
charges were dismissed, or (3) the charges were resolved by conviction 
of a non-homicide crime. 107 The study concluded that the state 
wrongfully convicted fifty-nine people of homicide. 108 The reasons for 
101. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 84 {1987). 
102. Id. at 31. 
103. Id. at 72. 
104. Id. at 60. 
105. Bedau and Radelet grouped the causes of wrongful conviction into four 
categories: (1) Police Error {including coerced or false confessions, negligence or 
overzealous police work); (2) Prosecutor Error {including suppression of exculpatory 
evidence or overzealous prosecution); (3) Witness Error (including mistaken eyewitness 
identification, perjury by a prosecution witness, and unreliable or erroneous prosection 
testimony); and (4) Other error (including misleading circumstantial evidence, 
incompetence of defense counsel, judicial denial of admissibility of exculpatory 
evidence, inadequate considerations of alibi evidence, erroneous judgement on cause of 
death, fraudulent alibi or false guilty plea made by defendant, conviction demanded by 
community outrage, and unknown reasons). Id. at 57. 
106. Marty I. Rosenbaum, Inevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Homicide 
Convictions, 1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 807 (1991). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 808. 
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the wrongful convictions were similar to the reasons found by Bedeau 
and Radelet.109 
Finally, between the years 1973 and 1992, 451 convicted murderers 
had their underlying convictions overturned on appeal.110 These 451 
people all had one thing in common: they were all sentenced to die. 
2. Observations 
There has been a good deal of criticism concerning the validity of 
studies attempting to show that persons in this country have been 
wrongfully convicted of capital crimes. 111One author has gone as far 
as to say that there is no evidence that anyone has been wrongfully 
executed in the United States in the last fifty years. 112 Others maintain 
the likelihood of error is almost non-existent because of the procedural 
safeguards afforded to capital defendants. 113 
It simply strains logic and credulity, however, to believe that any 
human system will be infallible. This is especially true where a heinous 
crime has been committed and guilt or innocence is the product of the 
collective assessment of a group of twelve human decisionmakers, each 
bringing to bear his or her own particular biases and prejudices. This is 
particularly true when the defendant is a member of an unpopular group. 
There are a great number of studies showing, for example, African-
Americans are far more likely to be sentenced to death than white 
Americans. 114 Of course, race and ethnicity have nothing to do with 
innocence or guilt. Yet, race plays a role in the decision-making 
process. 
Moreover, those who argue that the data are misleading or inaccurate 
attack the data only to the extent it goes to the identity issue. Critics of 
these studies assert the right person was convicted--the defendant 
actually committed the murder. Even if that is right, it does not address 
whether the defendant deserved the death penalty. The critics do not, 
because they cannot, face the issue of mens rea. Assuming the 
109. Id.; see also supra note 100. 
110. David 0. Stewart, Dealing with Death, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 50. 
111. See, e,g,, Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A 
Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988). 
112. Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993, 
at 33. 
113. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ESTABLISHING CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, S. REP. NO. 251, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983) ("[T]he procedural safeguards for criminal defendants 
mandated by the Supreme Court in recent years . . . have all but reduced the danger of 
error in [capital] cases to that of a mere theoretical possibility."). 
114. See supra note 15. 
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defendant committed the act, it does not inexorably follow that he is 
guilty of first-degree homicide. 
There can be no dispute that innocent people have been, and will be, 
convicted. The only dispute concerns the number of people that have 
been and will be wrongfully convicted. Since studies rely only on those 
cases where the error was later found empirically, the actual number of 
wrongful convictions must be higher since it is implausible to believe 
that every conviction error has been found. A capital defendant can 
rarely afford to present a defense where every conceivable bit of 
exculpatory or explanatory evidence is presented, where every conceiv-
able theory of innocence is explored, where every shade of scientific 
doubt is presented. In short, a capital defendant rarely obtains the same 
legal representation retained by Simpson. If every capital defendant had 
an expense account of $10 million, 115 maybe the incidence of convic-
tion error would be minimized.116 But this is far from reality. 
B. What the Evidence Cannot Show 
The empirical evidence, which is understated, demonstrates that 
capital conviction error occurs frequently. This is demonstrated by 
objective evidence of exculpation: witnesses recanting their testimony, 
subsequent scientific evidence, etc. The evidence of empirically 
provable error is understated, however, for a fundamental reason: there 
are some things that cannot be proven empirically. Three things stand 
out: (1) the defendant's intent (mens rea), (2) the ability of the 
defendant's counsel to present the evidence (legal representation), and 
(3) the defendant's state of mind ( capacity).117 
115. See supra note 8. 
116. Although given the other factors that come into play with respect to the 
decision to impose the death penalty, such as racism, this is doubtful. 
117. An example of how an attorney's inability to develop psychological evidence 
can have a devastating effect on his client is demonstrated by the sad case of Dalton 
Prejean: 
Compare Simpson, if you will, with a man named Dalton Prejean. He was 
executed in Louisiana in 1990 for the murder of a state policeman. Prejean 
was undeniably guilty. But he was also brain-damaged, marginally retarded, 
a down-and-outer, a brutalized kid who had killed before and spent hunks of 
his life in jail. He was a sweet man, most of the time, but when threatened 
or challenged he tended to overreact. 
Prejean was provided a court-appointed lawyer, a Ione practitioner who had 
never tried a death penalty case before. The lawyer, Thomas Guilbeau, later 
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1. Mens Rea 
a. Theory 
Thirty-seven states and the federal government employ the death 
penalty.118 The three states where it is employed the most are Texas, 
Florida and Virginia. 119 In each state, the death penalty is codified in 
a detailed and specific statute.120 
Most death penalty statutes look the same (probably because of certain 
Supreme Court rulings). A comparison of California's statute with those 
of Texas, Georgia and Florida evidences certain commonalities. Each 
state bifurcates the acts that entitle the state to seek death between first 
degree homicide generally and specific enumerated crimes.121 Discus-
sion here shall be limited to first-degree homicide. 
For first degree homicide there must be (1) a specific intent to murder 
and (2) premeditation and deliberation. 122 In theory, the death penalty 
is aimed at punishing the most heinous offenders. 123 Since this is 
essentially a judgment as to moral culpability, the most significant 
element to establish is intent, that is, mens rea. 
presented the appeals court with an astonishing document. He listed all the 
things he didn't do-the witnesses he didn't call and the documents that he 
had not presented. Prejean received the death penalty from a jury that was 
never told of his mental instability. Had they known, they said later, they 
never would have voted for death. 
Richard Cohen, A Suspect in a Double Murder on the Coast: The Death Penalty is 
Brought into Focus, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 25, 1994, at A8. 
118. Stewart, supra note 110, at 50. 
119. Death Row U.S.A., [Spring 1995] DEATH Row U.S.A. REP. (NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educ. Fund) Apr. 30, 1995 at 9. 
120. See supra note 25. 
121. The most common enumerated crimes are: the killing of a peace officer; the 
killing of a correctional officer during an escape or altercation while in prison; the 
killing of a fireman; kidnapping; arson; sexual battery; robbery; burglary; use of 
explosives; escape from lawful arrest; train wrecking; killing of a witness; killing of a 
judge; killing of a prosecutor; killing of an elected official; an especially heinous crime; 
killing while lying in wait; killing because of race, religion, nationality; killing by use 
of poison; multiple murders. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 190.2, 190.3 (West 1988 
& Supp. 1995). 
122. See supra note 25 (citing Texas, Georgia, and Florida statutes and the Model 
Penal Code). 
123. Most states allow the jury to consider aggravating circumstances in assessing 
whether the death penalty is warranted. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2, 190.3 
(West 1958 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995). 
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b. Practice 
As previously noted, the mens rea required for first degree homicide 
entails deliberative and premeditated conduct. If the offender is not 
mentally incapacitated (which, of course, could be a defense)124 and is 
acting in a calculative fashion (i.e., seeking to avoid detection and 
subsequent punishment) his crime will most often be committed in 
stealth. Most often there will be no direct eyewitnesses and proof will 
be circumstantial. How does a prosecutor go about establishing mens 
rea? 
The state, of course, has the burden of establishing all the substantive 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. For capital murder, that 
means the state must establish a specific intent to take a human life. 
Sometimes this is easy. The defendant makes out a very detailed plan 
on paper of the crime he intends to commit. This is rare. But even in 
such instances mens rea is established through inference. This is 
because in the vast majority of capital cases it is likely that the 
defendant never testifies at trial. 
What if there is no hard evidence of a plan and what if, as is most 
often the case, the defendant does not take the stand? The prosecution's 
burden of production is more difficult to meet. The prosecution must 
now rely on witnesses, and often, these witnesses did not directly 
observe the crime. There are several types of witnesses: (1) occurrence 
witnesses,125 (2) authentication witnesses,126 (3) opinion witness-
es, 127 and ( 4) expert witnesses. 128 These witnesses, however, only 
serve the purpose of establishing the identity of the murderer. They 
establish the fact that the defendant committed the crime. Absent a 
confession or an admission against interest, these witnesses cannot 
directly establish mens rea. So how is mens rea established? 
Usually the prosecutor puts on these witnesses to establish that the 
defendant could only accomplish his crime in one of several ways. For 







JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW§ 25.02 (1987). 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206, at 372 (John W. Strong ed., 4th abr. ed. 
Id. § 220, at 404. 
Id. § 11, at 17-19. 
Id. § 13, at 21. 
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killed the victim by :firing a revolver at close range. The manner in 
which the crime is committed allows an inference· to be drawn as to the 
defendant's intent. A gun aimed directly at a person's head at close 
range is rarely the result of an inadvertent act. 129 
c. Observations 
Because of the manner in which mens rea is established, it is difficult 
to quantify how often error is committed. How can you look within the 
soul of the defendant? One thing is clear, however. There is often error 
in establishing something that is much more facile to establish--the 
identity of the murderer. 130 If a jury is frequently wrong in determin-
ing who the killer is, logic tells us that it must be even more frequently 
wrong in determining mens rea, given that this is something fundamen-
tally more difficult to determine. 
A classic example is the Simpson case. Apparently, there were no 
eyewitnesses to the murders. The state's case consists solely of 
circumstantial evidence of two types: (1) evidence that put Simpson at 
the scene of the crime-DNA tested blood drops at the scene, 131 a 
bloody glove at Mr. Simpson's home,132 hair samples,133 and the 
testimony of a limousine driver regarding Simpson's absence from his 
house at the relevant times;134 and (2) evidence that established a 
motive-Simpson's relationship to the victim and his prior history of 
spousal abuse. 135 Because Simpson was charged with first degree 
murder, the state was put to the task of establishing premeditation. The 
state's circumstantial evidence included the weapon used (no one walks 
around with a fifteen inch stiletto knife), the clothing worn (dark) and 
Simpson's alleged history of stalking his former wife. 136 
But in the absence of an eyewitness, there was and is no dispositive 
way to prove premeditation. The jury could only infer premeditation. 
There is no way, for example, to discredit a theory that Simpson went 
to the crime scene intending to murder the victim, had a change of heart, 
and then suddenly enraged upon discovering her in the presence of 
another man acted reflexively and brutally in the heat of passion. Even 
129. For a good discussion of the case law in this area, see C.R. Mccorkle, 
Annotation, Homicide: Presumption of Deliberation or Premeditation From the 
Circumstances Attending the Killing, 96 A.LR. 2d 1435 (1964). 
130. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. 
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if there had been an eyewitness, absent a confession, there simply is no 
dispositive way of entering the mind of the miscreant. 137 
2. Incompetent Counsel 
a. Theory 
It is likely that very few capital defendants plead guilty to a charge 
that possibly entails the imposition of death. The people on death row 
are there because of a conviction by a jury in an adversarial proceeding. 
Guilt or innocence, in practical terms, is a result of the presentation of 
evidence at a legal proceeding. Under the Sixth Amendment every 
person charged with a serious criminal offense is entitled to be 
represented by counsel and if the defendant is penurious the state will 
appoint the same.138 In theory, if a person is represented by an 
attorney he can defend himself in a fair and just manner and the result 
of the trial will be fair and just. In theory. 
b. Practice 
That crime is a function of socio-economic factors is beyond 
dispute.139 The highest crime neighborhoods in the community are all 
too frequently also the poorest, neighborhoods.140 It necessarily 
follows that most defendants are poor, Indeed, the evidence indicates 
that most people charged with capital offenses cannot afford attorneys 
and thus must have attorneys appointed for them or rely exclusively on 
the offices of the local public defender. 141 That the imposition of the 
death penalty and wealth are related is irrefutable. For example, in 
137. And even if there was a confession there still is no way of dispositively 
proving premeditation for at least two reasons: (1) the declarant could have been 
mentally incapacitated at the time of the statement, and (2) a confession is not 
necessarily actually true, it is merely legally presumed true ifit is against one's interest. 
138. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
139. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING 
VIOLENCE 131-39 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993) (concerning the 
nexus between low socioeconomic status and crime); E. Britt Patterson, Poverty, Income 
Inequality, and Community Crime Rates, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 755 (1991) (same). 
140. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 139, at 131-39. 
141. Lisa R. Duffett, Note, Habeas Corpus and Actual Innocence of the Death 
Sentence After Sawyer v. Whitley: Another Nail into the Coffin of State Capital 
Defendants, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 121, 128 (1993). 
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California, as of July 1, 1994, 388 persons were on death row. 142 
Every single person so situated was poor enough to qualify for state-
appointed counsel. 143 
Often the attorneys appointed to represent capital defendants are 
inexperienced. 144 The public defenders that represent capital defen-
dants are overworked. 145 It is not surprising, then, that the legal 
services obtained by capital defendants are often poor, if not incompe-
tent. In fact, one study concluded that legal errors are made in at least 
fifty percent of all capital cases. 146 
A recent study by the Spangenberg Group of Newton, Massachusetts 
sheds light on the situation.147 The group prepared a study for the 
State Bar of Texas analyzing legal representation in death penalty 
cases.148 The group's conclusion was as follows: "We believe, in the 
strongest terms possible, that Texas has already reached the crisis stage 
in capital representation . . . . In summary, the results of our· study 
discloses that the situation in Texas can only be described as desper-
ate."149 
A number of studies have shown that court-appointed attorneys in 
capital cases are severely underpaid by statute. 15° For example, 
Louisiana allows a maximum total compensation of $1000 per capital 
142. Weinstein & Abrahamson, supra note 11, at Al. 
143. Bob Egeldo, The Death Penalty is for Poor People, History May be on 
Simpson Side, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 6, 1994, at 5A (citing Lynn Holton, spokeswoman 
for the California Judicial Council, as his source). In contemplating the relationship 
between the death penalty and wealth one is reminded of the lyrics to the traditional 
english ballad, "Gallows Pole," popularized by the rock group Led Zeppelin in its 1970 
recording: 
Hangman, hangman, hold it a little while/I think I see my friends coming, 
riding many a mile/Friends, did you get some silver?/ Did you get a little 
gold?/ What did you bring me, my dear friends, to keep me from the Gallows 
Pole?/I couldn't get no silver/ I couldn't get no gold/ You know we're too 
damn poor to keep you from the gallows pole. 
LED ZEPPELIN, Gallows Pole, on LED ZEPPELIN III (Atlantic Records 1970). 
144. Bright, supra note 19, at 1850. 
145. Id. at 1843-44, 1848; see also Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: 
Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled To Render The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. 
L.J. 363 (1993). 
146. Duffett, supra note 141, at 128. 
147. See Gary Taylor, Texas Death-Penalty Study Hit, NAT'L LAW J., Apr. 26, 
1993, at 3. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death 
Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30, 32-33; see also Steve Bright, In Defense of Life: 
Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority, and Disadvantaged Persons 
Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. REV. 849, 849-70 (1992). 
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case.151 The same is true in Alabama.152 In Oklahoma, the limit is 
$3200. 153 The effect of this statutory scheme is to create a scarcity of 
good available attorneys.154 Often, courts are forced to appoint any 
available attorney, regardless of experience. 155 
c. Observations 
None of the aforementioned studies purports to estimate the rate of 
conviction error in capital cases based on attorney error. The reports are 
couched in subjective valuations regarding legal representation. But it 
is not difficult to hypothesize that because of the lack of qualified legal 
representation in these cases, the incidence of error may be higher than 
in other matters. This is probably because there are two groups of 
attorneys working on these matters: (1) inexperienced attorneys and (2) 
overworked attorneys. In the first category fall those attorneys appointed 
by the court who have little or no experience in death penalty litigation. 
In the second category fall experienced public defenders whose caseloads 
are simply too heavy. Exculpatory or mitigating evidence is often not 
developed and significant leads are not pursued simply because the 
attorney does not have the time nor the resources. 
In some states public defenders are effectively limited to fees of less 
than $1000 in capital cases. 156 By necessity, the opportunity for 
151. Klein, supra note 145, at 366. For a comprehensive review of this area, see 
Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum 
Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 281 (1991). 
152. Klein, supra note 145, at 366. 
153. Id. at 366-67. 
154. Id. at 367. 
155. Id. 
156. It has been noted that: 
Almost anything pays more than defending a client in a death penalty case
In some rural areas of Texas, lawyers receive no more than $800 to handle a 
capital case. Generally the hourly rate is $50 or less.. In Virginia, the 
effective hourly rate for defending a poor person facing execution is $13. In 
Kentucky, the most a lawyer can get in a capital case is $2500. 
Ridgeway, supra note 57, at 6. Moreover, attorneys for the Southern Center for Human 
Rights which handles over 60 capital cases a year make an annual salary of $23,000. 
Id. New York public defenders make $32,000 a year. Id. (Compare that to first year 
Wall Street firm associates who routinely make over $80,000.) It has bitterly been noted 
that at Robert Shapiro's estimated hourly rate of $650, an indigent person in Alabama 
could rent Mr. Simpson's counsel for about ninety minutes. Talk Back Live (CNN 
television broadcast, Aug. 22, 1994, 1 a.m. (EST)) (transcript 101) (comments of Susan 
Rook). 
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capital defendants to put on scientific, medical, and other expert 
testimony is severely limited.157 The necessity for effective assistance 
of counsel in capital cases is heightened by the fact that since the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 158 states now bifurcate 
capital trials into two phases: (1) guilt and (2) penalty. 159 The penalty 
phase does not present the opportunity for the presentation of objective 
facts concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused, but involves the 
presentation of subjective mitigation or aggravation character evi-
dence.160 A premium is placed on the ability of counsel to present this 
evidence. Two examples are illustrative. 
In Mitchell v. Kemp, 161 William Mitchell shot and killed Christo-
pher Carr. He was arrested and later confessed. At the penalty phase 
of the trial Mr. Mitchell's counsel failed to put on any evidence of 
mitigating circumstances: 
Mitchell's counsel did not offer mitigating evidence because he failed to 
investigate possible sources of such evidence. Evidence presented at Mitchell's 
habeas hearing and available at the time of the trial indicated that of Mitchell's 
attorney had investigated Mitchell's family, friends, and school and psychologi-
cal records, he could have presented numerous character witnesses and a history 
of Mitchell's psychological deterioration as a result of violent homosexual 
prison rapes, overwhelming poverty, and familial turbulence. 162 
Mr. Mitchell was sentenced to die.163 
In Washington v. Strickland, 164 David Washington pleaded guilty 
to three brutal murders. At the penalty phase of the trial his attorney 
neither sought nor requested a psychiatric evaluation of his client.165 
Mr. ·washington was sentenced to die. 166 
In stark contrast stands the Simpson matter. Mr. Simpson has a net 
worth estimated to be more than $10 million.167 He hired not only 
157. For example, it has been estimated that it costs anywhere between $2500 to 
$10,000 to present expert testimony to refute a prosecution's bodily secretion evidence. 
Ridgeway, supra note 57 (quoting Professor Stephen Bright of the Harvard Law School). 
158. 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
159. See Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital 
Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987). 
160. Id. at 486-87. 
161. 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985). 
162. Fong, supra note 159, at 46 (citations omitted). 
163. 827 F.2d 1433, 1434; Mitchell v. Georgia, 234 Ga. 160, 214 S.E.2d 900 
(1975). 
164. 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. Unit B), rev'd on reh 'g, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit 
B 1982) (en bane), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
165. 466 U.S. at 673. 
166. Id. at 675. 
167. See Abrahamson, supra note 8, at Al. 
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some of the best trial attorneys, 168 but also attorneys at the top of their 
field in appellate work, 169 criminal procedural matters, 170 and DNA 
evidence.1 1 Additionally, his trial team consisted of scientific experts 
in DNA analysis, 172 autopsies, 173 and blood samples, 174 and also 
top forensic and criminal investigators.175 Before trial it was estimated 
that Simpson would spend $1 million a month in attorneys' fees. 176 
Because of his wealth, Simpson was able to make a voluminous number 
of pre-trial motions. 177 Regardless of the outcome in the Simpson 
case, one thing is clear: he received the best defense money could buy. 
In murder cases, however, this is the exception and not the rule. 
C. The Emerging Problem of Free Will 
1. Theory 
Punishment178 is based on notions of moral culpability, which in 
turn is inextricably linked to the concept of free will.179 Thus, if one 
168. Robert Shapiro, Johnnie Cochran, and F. Lee Bailey. 
169. Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz. 
170. Santa Clara University Law School Dean Gerald Uelman. 
171. Barry C. Scheck. 
172. Michael Baden or Edward Blake. 
173. Dr. Henry Lee. 
174. Michael Baden or Edward Blake. 
175. John E. McNally, Zvonko Pavelic, and Patrick J. McKenna. 
176. By one estimate, Simpson would spend about $50,000 a day ( or more than $1 
million a month) in legal fees. George de Lama & Vincent J. Schodoloski, Simpson 
Case: Most is Yet to Come, Cm. TRIB., July 10, 1994, at Cl; see also Abrahamson, 
supra note 8, at Al, A21. 
177. A partial list of the motions filed include: Motion for Pre-Trial Discovery, 
Motion for Immediate Disclosure of Exculpatory Leads, Motion to Permit Independent 
PCR HLA DQ Alpha DNA Testing, Motion to Suppress and Return Evidence, to Quash 
and Traverse Warrant. 
178. I use the term "punishment" here as opposed to "incarceration," "confine-
ment," or "imprisonment" on purpose. The latter terms are justified by many goals, 
including moral culpability, but also deterrence, safety, and rehabilitation. Pure 
punishment, however, is based solely on moral culpability. 
179. The notion of free will, in tum, may be viewed as merely a philosophical 
construct. John Stuart Mill observed: 
The metaphysical theory of free-will, as held by philosophers ... was invented 
because the supposed alternative of admitting human actions to be necessary 
was deemed inconsistent with every one's instinctive consciousness, as well 
as humiliating to the pride and even degrading to the moral nature of man. 
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is thought not to have acted volitionally, he is not deemed deserving of 
punishment. This principle has been embodied in the law of homicide 
at least since the time of Daniel M'Naghten s Case180 in 1843. At 
common law, the criminally insane could not be executed for their 
crimes for this reason.181 
The death penalty, as we have seen, is justified on three grounds: 
deterrence, safety, and retribution. If the defendant is mentally 
incompetent, the latter two goals are not served. To the extent 
confinement is needed of the criminally insane it must be conceded that 
it would literally be overkill to execute such a person. 
It should be noted also that whatever the merits of the death penalty, 
even its proponents will admit that only those deserving of the most 
serious penalty should receive it.182 To the extent a person is not 
morally culpable the death penalty has no application. 
2. Practice 
In the past decade an enormous body of scientific literature based on 
biological and neurological data has seriously put into question the 
notion of free will with respect to, at least, certain types of criminally 
deviant behavior. 183 A review of all the extensive literature would be 
6 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF Logic RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE (1843), 
reprinted in JOHN STUART MILL, THE LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES 22 (Open Court 
Publishing Co. 1988) (8th ed. 1872). Clarence Darrow, for one, doubted that free will 
exists and thus decried the use of punishment for retribution: 
All punishment for the purpose of causing suffering, or growing out of hatred, 
is cruel and anti-social; that however much society may feel the need of 
confining the criminal, it must first of all understand that the act had an all-
sufficient cause for which the individual was in no way responsible, and must 
find the cause of his conduct, and, so far as possible, remove the cause. 
CLARENCE DARROW, CRIME: ITS CAUSE AND TREATMENT 36 (1922). 
180. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
181. It should be noted that there are a growing number of jurisdictions in this 
country that have attempted to severely limit, if not abolish, the insanity defense. 
Margaret C. McHugh, Comment, Greenfield v. Wainwright: The Use of Post Miranda 
Silence to Rebut the Insanity Defense, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 221 n.1 (1985). The 
restriction of the insanity defense, however, can be justified because of society's need 
for protection or society's need to rehabilitate the offender. Obviously it cannot be 
based on notions of deterrence (which assumes the machinations of a rational mind) or 
retribution. But see McCollum v. North Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2784 (1984) (upholding 
execution of mentally disabled defendant). 
182. See, e.g., David Dolinko, Forward: How to Criticize the Death Penalty, 77 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546, 588 (1986). 
183. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of 
Genetics, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 313, 318-21 (1992); Maureen P. Coffey, Note, The Genetic 
Defense: Excuse or Explanation?, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 353, 358-78 (1993). 
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impossible. One example, however, is illustrative. Lawrence Taylor 
cogently states the problem.184 
Taylor discusses the possibility that criminals are not shaped by their 
environment but are marked by genetic differences in their physiological 
make-up. 185 Animals, when encountering a threat, are genetically 
programmed for fight or flight. 186 Over the course of several million 
years of evolution, humans were also so programmed. 187 When the 
world was less civilized humans regularly had to fight to survive, 
making aggression ( or at least some forms of violence) adaptive.188 
However, with the advance of civilization violence became seen as anti-
social and maladaptive.189 Thus, most people today can control or do 
not have the desire to commit violent acts. 190 However, there appears 
to be a group in society that is genetically predisposed towards violent 
criminal acts. 191 This is reflected in recidivism rates which indicate 
that the vast majority of crimes are committed by a small number of 
individuals.192 
Taylor has identified a portion of the brain that may cause violent 
criminals to act as they do.193 The portion of the brain, known as the 
limbic brain, is the locus of violent behavior.194 This portion was first 
developed in more primitive animals and then inherited by humans in 
the evolutionary process.195 As human brains have become more 
complex there is a greater chance for a malfunction of the brain. 196 
Within the limbic portion of the brain is a small almond-shaped portion 
known as the amygdala.197 "The amygdala is, apparently, a critical 
184. See LAWRENCE TAYLOR, BORN TO CRIME: THE GENETIC CAUSES OF 
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1984). 
185. Id. at 17. 
186. Id. at 51. 
187. Id. at 29-30, 51. 
188. Id. at 33. 
189. Id. at 9-10, 33. 
190. Id. at 33, 62. 
191. Id. at 33, 48. 
192. Id. at 51-52. 




197. Id. at 52. 
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organ in the regulation of emotions in general and of fear, rage and 
anger in particular."198 
Researchers have found that when the amygdala is removed or 
destroyed an animal that is normally vicious becomes complacent and 
will not attack what would be its normal prey.199 On the other hand, 
when the amygdala is stimulated the animal becomes extremely 
aggressive and will attack other animals with an inordinate amount of 
viciousness.200 Researchers have also found that when other portions 
of the brain are stimulated, an animal which is in the process of a 
vicious act will immediately stop its attack and display calm and 
submissive behavior.201 
Generally, what is true of mammal brains is true of human 
brains.202 That violence can by traced to a specific brain site is 
evidenced by a study of epileptics.203 Epilepsy is a hereditary disorder 
of the brain that is characterized by electrical discharges within the brain 
and the resultant excessive stimulation of certain areas.204 When the 
electrical discharges occur in the temporal lobe area of the limbic brain 
the reaction of the individual can take on a potentially criminal 
nature.205 A team of Russian researchers found that criminals with 
epilepsy had a much higher incidence of violent criminal acts over a 
similar size group of schizophrenics.206 A study of the Massachusetts 
General Hospital looked at the incidence of epilepsy in violent crimi-
nals.207 The study showed that fifty percent of the violent criminals 
exhibited epileptic-like phenomena.208 (This is ten times greater than 
the general population.)209 
A wealth of other scientific evidence also suggests that there is a 
genetic component to crime and violent behavior.210 The literature is 
too voluminous to even summarize. But the importance of the evidence 
198. Id. at 52. 
199 ... H. MARK & F.R. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN 59 (Harper & Row, 
1970). 
200. TAYLOR, supra note 184, at 53. 
201. Id. at 52-53. 
202. Id. at 53. 
203. Id. at 54. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 55. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 57. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. For a good discussion of the scientific evidence, see Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra 
note 183, at 313; Coffey, supra note 183, at 353. 
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with respect to the legal paradigm is. self-evident. The notion of free-
will has been challenged by the notion of biological determinism: 
Genetics has profoundly altered the perception ofpersonhood within our culture. 
This change has, in turn, challenged many of the core principles on which 
current norms are based and has compelled lawmakers to reconsider the legal 
rules that mediate the relationships among persons and between individuals and 
the broader community. 211 · 
Peter D. Kramer poses the rhetorical question: who or what are 
we?212 The question is of more than academic interest. In the past half 
dozen years a number of studies have shown that not only certain 
behaviors, but entire personalities can be reshaped by drug therapy.213 
The drugs, by and large, act on specific sites within the brain.214 
3. Observations 
To the extent it is possible to localize a specific site in the brain as 
the cause of a behavior, and to the extent scientific research reveals that 
the behavior can be modified by altering the chemistry of this site, our 
fundamental notions of free will are challenged. Is a person's conduct 
the result of a freely made decision or of a biological predisposition? 
Early in the Simpson case the prosecution opined that the defense might 
interject a diminished capacity defense.215 Indeed, Simpson retained 
the services of psychiatric experts.216 
Since the death penalty obviously serves no rehabilitory purpose, it 
can only be justified, or morally sustained, based on notions of just 
dessert. Should we execute someone who did not will his actions? Can 
such an execution be morally justified? 
211. Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 183, at 315. 
212. PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC (1993). 
213. Stanley N. Wellborn, New Ways to Heal Disturbed Minds, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Feb. 16, 1976, at 33; David Gleman & Mary Hager, Psychotherapy in the 
'80s, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30, 1981, at 70. · 
214. For a good book on the cartography of the brain, see WILLIAM H. CALVIN & 
GEORGE A. 0JEMANN, CONVERSATIONS WITH NEIL'S BRAIN: THE NEURAL NATURE OF 
THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1994). 
215. This Week With David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, June 19, 1994) 
(comments of Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti); see also Larry King Live 
(CNN television broadcast, June 18, 1994) (transcript 1150) (comments of Los Angeles 
District Attorney Gil Garcetti). 
216. Dr. Saul Faerstein. 
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III. THE PERFECT REMEDY IN THE IMPERFECT SYSTEM 
A. Against Deterrence 
The original question posed was whether the death penalty should be 
considered necessary. Something is necessary, by definition, only if it 
furthers some legitimate goal. Three goals have been advanced in 
support of the death penalty. The first goal is deterrence. 
Based on the empirical evidence, it is clear that the death penalty 
does not serve the goal of deterrence. Too many studies indicate that 
the homicide rate bears no relation to the existence or non-existence of 
capital punishment to ignore this conclusion.217 In fact, the data seem 
to suggest that the death penalty actually has the opposite effect by 
brutalizing society.218 
As previously discussed, the deterrence argument is based on a 
number of utilitarian assumptions regarding human behavior and 
motivation. None of these assumptions is necessarily true. First, the 
utilitarian argument only makes sense if we assume that murder is the 
product of a calculating, rational mind, and not a by-product of a genetic 
predisposition. But it would appear that violent behavior, at least to 
some extent, may be based more on body chemistry than anything 
else.219 
Even if this were not so, the assumption is that a murderer values the 
continuation of his own life over the cessation of the life of his victim. 
Why? It does not inexorably follow that this is the case. This 
proposition is clearly refuted by those serving time on death row. ,There 
are people who have committed murder knowing that the penalty is 
death. The calculus of the decision making process, if such a process 
intelligibly exists (a problematic proposition, at best), probably turns 
more on the criminal's calculation of his likelihood of being caught 
rather than the degree of punishment involved.220 
But in any event, looked at in a light most favorable to death penalty 
proponents, the empirical data, at best, is equivocal. Maybe the death 
penalty deters some murders, maybe it does not. Its use, then, is a social 
experiment. Its cost is the cost of innocent lives. Until the empirical 
217. See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 183-214 and accompanying text. 
220. Indeed, French social theorist Jacques Barzun, a proponent of the death 
penalty, has opined that death is probably a preferable to life imprisonment for most 
men. Jacques Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, 31 AM. SCHOLAR 181 (1962). 
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debate can be resolved, if ever, there would seem to be no utilitarian 
justification for the continued imposition of the death penalty. 
B. Against Safety 
The second utilitarian argument is safety. The finality of the death 
penalty insures that convicted murderers will kill no more. The 
empirical data, of course, seem to indicate that the threat of further 
homicide is greatly exaggerated. But the threat exists nonetheless. 
To justify a safety argument, since it is based on notions of utility 
(maximization of the aggregate good) it would have to be shown that the 
number of future homicides prevented exceeds the number of innocent 
people convicted. The evidence with respect to the latter figure, by 
necessity, can never be empirically established with any degree of 
certainty. And thus, the continuation of the death penalty once again 
becomes. a social experiment. 
But if safety is the goal, the experiment is unnecessary. The same 
result can be obtained without the sacrifice of any innocent blood. 
Convicted murderers can be sentenced to solitary confinement for life 
without the possibility of parole.221 
C. Against Retribution 
The only goal in favor of the death penalty that remains is retribution. 
Does retribution justify the continuation of a system that invariably will 
result in the execution of those not deserving of punishment (i.e., the 
innocent)? The only answer can be no for several reasons. 
First, retributive justice is a deontological notion based on the premise 
that the act justifies itself: the death penalty is warranted, not for the 
results that obtain, but rather, it is warranted, in and of itself, because of 
the virtue inherent in it. Retribution is based on Kant's notion of the 
categorical imperative. One categorical imperative is that since 
221. The most common objection to this is based on cost. That is, the argument 
is often advanced that society should not bear the cost of sustaining the life of a 
convicted first degree murderer. But numerous studies have indicated that it is actually 
cheaper to incarcerate a person for life than it is to execute him. See, e.g., Steven G. 
Gey, Justice Scalia 's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 108 n.184 (1992); 
Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses from the Death Penalty: "Old Sparky 's" Jolt to 
the Legal Profession, 14 PACE L. REV. 1, 16 n.88 (1994). 
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retribution is not based on utility, persons cannot be used to obtain 
objectives. Each act, in and of itself, must be justified. But if innocent 
lives are taken people are being used. The innocent (who are, by 
definition, not deserving of punishment) are used to serve a purpose 
disconnected with the act taken against them. That is, justice does not 
inhere to the act of executing the innocent. If such an act ever makes 
sense it can only be for some other utilitarian purpose. But, as we have 
seen, the death penalty does not serve any utilitarian purpose.222 
Second, to be consistent with Kant's first moral imperative--one 
should act consistent with what one would will to become universal 
law - the death penalty can only be imposed on the guilty. No one 
would will as universal law that the death penalty be imposed occasion-
ally on the innocent. But, of course, it is impossible to insure such 
perfection given that the imposition of a sentence is based on the 
machinations of an inherently fallible system. 
Third, even if every person executed is proven infallibly to have 
committed the crime, the death penalty is not justified on a theory of 
retributive justice because retribution is synonymous with moral 
culpability. Given recent advances in medical technology, it is highly 
problematic whether a jury can ever determine who is deserving of 
death. The state of the evidence is inchoate. Until we know more about 
the true nature of free will, although incarceration will still be justified 
(for purposes such as safety and rehabilitation), death is not justified 
because the consequences of error (in determining the culpable) are 
needlessly irreversible. 
The fallacy of the retribution argument is highlighted by the Simpson 
case. The death penalty was not sought by the prosecution presumably 
because of the common perception that it would not be imposed by a 
jury, and by seeking it, the prosecution would diminish its chances of 
obtaining a conviction. 
But why would a jury not impose the death penalty if it was 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Simpson deliberately and 
222. One obvious counter to this is that there are always costs attendant to 
obtaining a benefit. Often this cost is life. For example, the state chooses to permit the 
manufacture, sale and use of automobiles knowing full well that people will be killed 
in automobile accidents. The analogy is false. An automobile accident is just that, an 
accident-an unplanned and unintentional act by private citizens. This is much different 
than a planned and intentional act by the state. A better analogy would be as follows. 
Suppose it was shown that in order for a community to avail itself of automobiles the 
local government would have to randomly execute X numbers of citizens by lottery. 
Would the use of automobiles in this context be justified? Moreover, would the use of 
automobiles be justified where other modes of transportation (i.e., rail or bus) exist? The 
answer is obvious. 
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wilfully murdered two people? No one, of course, can answer this 
question. But there are a number of possibilities. First, the imposition 
of the death penalty would represent the use of a person for strictly 
utilitarian purpose. Few believe that Mr. Simpson presents a threat to 
the general public and even fewer believe that his otherwise exemplary 
life merits such harsh vengeance. If executed then, it would be for the 
sake of setting an example for others (i.e., for deterrence). This 
sacrifice, in the absence of a truly depraved sacrificial lamb, may offend 
our sensibilities. In short, execution here would violate Kant's first 
moral imperative. 
But more importantly, given the wealth of seemingly contradictory 
circumstantial and scientific evidence adduced before trial--evidence 
only obtainable by virtue of Mr. Simpson's financial resources - there 
would always remain in a jury's mind a tiny doubt as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. But where the accused, in circumstances 
unconnected with his crime, has led a depraved and morally reprehensi-
ble life, a jury m.ay be inclined to dismiss such doubts on the logic that 
the accused deserves to die, if not for this crime, than for others he must 
have committed. If the accused has led an exemplary life, however, the 
possibility of innocence, no matter how remote, is not so easily excused. 
The ultimate judgment thus becomes a function, not of the actual crime 
itself, but of other unproven crimes. Retribution is exacted not so much 
because the accused acted badly, but because the accused is bad. For 
this reason the death penalty reveals its true socio-economic face. 
CONCLUSION 
There is only one justification for the death penalty that survives 
scrutiny: retribution. There is also one inevitable consequence of the 
death penalty: innocent people will be executed. The death penalty 
only serves some vague, intangible interest in justice. It is not necessary 
when counterbalanced by the specific, tangible interest in not having the 
state intentionally take innocent lives. The state's legitimate interests 
can be served by a less drastic measure. An irreversible remedy in a 
fallible system. is never justified. It was for this reason that recently 
retired Justice Blackm.un vowed never again to "tinker with the 
machinery of death. . . . The problem. is that the inevitability of factual, 
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legal and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill 
some defendants . . .. "223 
In the end, no one can say whether Simpson is or was deserving of 
death. But one thing is clear: regardless of whether a jury convicts him, 
there remains the possibility that he is not guilty. It is this doubt---even 
if it be deemed an unreasonable one - that in the end may have 
condemned the prosecution to not even attempt to seek the death 
penalty. How can we put O.J. to death? What if we are wrong? 
223. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
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